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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY;  
PAUL R. ARMSTRONG, Administrative Law Judge; 
ABBE MAY, An impartial vocation expert;  
JAMES SHORT, Administrative Appeals Judge 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-11534) 
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 13, 2020 
 
Before: JORDAN, BIBAS and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges 
 








* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
 Linda Taylor seeks judicial review of a decision denying her application for 
Disability Income Benefits and Supplemental Security Income.  Taylor, a 57-year-old 
woman, suffers from left shoulder degenerative joint disease, degenerative disc disease, 
and a systemic autoimmune disease (“Sjogren’s syndrome”).  She complained that she 
suffers from back and shoulder pain, as well as weakness throughout her body.  Taylor 
claimed that she was unable to perform the work of her previous jobs as hotel 
housekeeper and garment sorter because of her ailments.    
The ALJ denied Taylor’s request for benefits after performing the five-step 
sequential evaluation process for determining disability.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) 
and § 416.920(a); Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).1  He determined 
that Taylor had severe physical impairments and nonsevere mental impairments, but that 
her impairments were not as severe as those listed in the regulation.  At step four, the 
ALJ found that, despite Taylor’s testimony that she could not maintain the physical 
demands of her job and had difficulty walking, her medical records showed no motor or 
ambulatory deficits.  The ALJ concluded that Taylor maintained enough “residual 
functional capacity” to perform light work as a garment sorter or housekeeper.  The 
 
1 The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the applicant has engaged in substantial 
gainful activity since the alleged disability onset date; (2) whether the applicant has a 
severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment or 
combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listed impairment; (4) whether, 
despite the severe impairment, the applicant retains the residual functional capacity to 
perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the applicant is capable of performing 
other jobs that exist in the national economy, considering her age, education, work 
experience, and residual functional capacity.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Fargnoli v. 
Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
District Court upheld the decision, noting that the record evidence supported the ALJ’s 
findings.2  Taylor appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(g).  Like the District Court, we must uphold the ALJ’s finding if it is supported by 
substantial evidence.  See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 130 (3d Cir. 2002).  Substantial evidence is “such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 552 (quotation marks omitted).  It is “more than a 
mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial 
evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual 
inquiry differently.  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).   
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of the claim at step four.3  The ALJ 
adequately explained his reasoning based on the entire record and the testimonial 
evidence.  Despite Taylor’s own testimony to the contrary, her medical records showed 
that she retained significant physical strength in her shoulder and had no difficulty 
walking.  For example, at a medical examination in 2010, Taylor complained of back 
 
 
2 The District Court also dismissed Taylor’s argument that the ALJ was biased against 
her because of her race.  Taylor has not pursued that claim on appeal and we will not 
address it here.  
 
3 Taylor has not challenged the ALJ’s conclusions at steps one, two, and three. 
 
 
pain that had lasted for the past 15 to 20 years, but her examination revealed normal 
walking, an ability to get up from the examination table without difficulty, and normal 
range of motion, good coordination, and no strength deficits.  ECF 10-7 at 3-5.  
Examinations in September 2014 and February 2015 revealed that Taylor walked with a 
normal gait and had normal motor control.  ECF 10-7 at 61, 71.  The ALJ noted that 
Taylor was not limited in performing daily life activities, like cooking, cleaning, driving, 
and shopping.  See ECF 10-6 at 26-33.  In addition, the vocational expert testified that 
Taylor’s impairments would not limit her from performing her past work as a garment 
sorter and that she could still do the work of a housekeeper.  See ECF 10-2 at 70.  
Taylor argues that the ALJ did not “develop” all relevant medical reports before 
making his decision.  However, Taylor has not pointed to what information specifically 
was missing or what effect it would have had on the proceedings.  See Shinseki v. 
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“[T]he party that seeks to have a judgment set aside 
because of an erroneous ruling carries the burden of showing that prejudice resulted.”).  
The ALJ also granted Taylor an additional 30 days after the hearing to produce more 
medical evidence, which the ALJ admitted into the record.  To the extent that Taylor 
argues that the ALJ mischaracterized a letter from her previous employer, the District 
Court correctly concluded that the letter was properly characterized as a resignation letter 
and that, even if it was mischaracterized, the error was harmless under the circumstances.  
Apart from a few generalized statements that the ALJ failed to consider evidence in the 
 
record, Taylor has provided no detail as to why the decision was not supported by 
substantial evidence, nor has she raised any substantiated legal errors made by the ALJ.4 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
4 Taylor also argues that she suffered from two additional severe impairments that the 
ALJ did not recognize (cervical disc disease with radiculopathy and tendonitis in her 
right shoulder and arm), and that the ALJ “cherry picked” evidence from the record.  
However, Taylor did not present those arguments to the District Court and this Court 
does not consider evidence or claims that were not first presented to the District Court.  
See United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 202 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010).  We note, too, that 
Taylor has expressed general disagreement with the ALJ’s decision and has stated that 
she takes various medications for relief and that she continues to suffer from 
complications from her arthritis which prevent her from working.  However, as the ALJ 
and District Court both concluded, Taylor’s medical records and the testimony of the 
vocational expert contradict those claims.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (noting that, 
when a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain indicate a greater severity of impairment 
than the objective medical evidence supports, the ALJ can give weight to factors such as 
physician’s reports, treatments to relieve symptoms, and a claimant’s daily activities). 
 
